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Abstract
I present a model in which the incomplete nature of contracts governing international trans-
actions limits the extent to which the production process can be fragmented across borders.
Because of contractual frictions, goods are initially manufactured in the same country where
product development takes place. Only when the good becomes suﬃciently standardized is
the manufacturing stage of production shifted to a low-wage foreign location. Solving for the
optimal organizational structure, I develop a new version of the product cycle hypothesis in
which manufacturing is shifted abroad ﬁrst within ﬁrm boundaries, and only at a later stage to
independent foreign ﬁrms. (JEL D23, F12, F14, F21, F23, L22, L33)
In an enormously inﬂuential article, Raymond Vernon (1966) described a natural life cycle for
the typical commodity. Most new goods, he argued, are initially manufactured in the country
where they are ﬁrst developed, with the bulk of innovations occurring in the industrialized North.
Only when the appropriate designs have been worked out and the production techniques have been
standardized is the locus of production shifted to the less developed South, where wages are lower.
Vernon emphasized the role of multinational ﬁrms in the international transfer of technology. In
his formulation of a product’s life cycle, the shift of production to the South is a proﬁt-maximizing
decision from the point of view of the innovating ﬁrm.
The “product cycle hypothesis” soon gave rise to an extensive empirical literature that searched
for evidence of the patterns suggested by Vernon.1 The picture emerging from this literature turned
out to be much richer than Vernon originally envisioned. The evidence indeed supports the existence
of product cycles, but it has become clear that foreign direct investment by multinational ﬁr m si sn o t
the only vehicle of production transfer to the South. The literature has identiﬁed several instances
1See William Gruber et al. (1967), Seev Hirsch (1967), Louis T. Wells, Jr. (1969), and Thomas G. Parry (1975)
for early tests of the theory.
1in which technologies have been transferred to the South through licensing, subcontracting, and
other similar arm’s length arrangements. More interestingly, several studies have pointed out that
the choice between intraﬁrm and market transactions is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by both the degree
of standardization of the technology as well as by the transferor’s resources devoted to product
development.2 In particular, overseas assembly of relatively new and unstandardized products
tends to be undertaken within ﬁrm boundaries, while innovators seem more willing to resort to
licensing and subcontracting in standardized goods with little product development requirements.
The product cycle hypothesis has also attracted considerable attention among international
trade theorists eager to explore the macroeconomic and trade implications of Vernon’s insights.
Paul Krugman (1979) developed a simple model of trade in which new goods are produced in the
industrialized North and exchanged for old goods produced in the South. In order to concentrate
on the eﬀects of product cycles on trade ﬂows and relative wages, Krugman (1979) speciﬁed a
very simple form of technological transfer, with new goods becoming old goods at an exogenous
rate. This “imitation lag,” as he called it, was later endogenized by Gene M. Grossman and
Elhanan Helpman (1991a,b) using the machinery developed by the endogenous growth literature.
In particular, Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) developed models in which purposeful innovation
and imitation gave rise to endogenous product cycles, with the timing of production transfer being
a function of the imitation eﬀort exerted by ﬁrms in the South.3 As the empirical literature on the
product cycle suggests, however, the bulk of technology transfer is driven by voluntary decisions of
Northern ﬁrms, which choose to undertake oﬀshore production within ﬁrm boundaries or transact
with independent subcontractors or licensees.4
In this paper, I provide a theory of the product cycle that is much more akin to Vernon’s (1966)
original formulation and that delivers implications that are very much in line with the ﬁndings of
the empirical literature discussed above. In the model, goods are produced combining a hi-tech
input, which I associate with product development, and a low-tech input, which is meant to capture
the simple assembly or manufacturing of the good. As in Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b), the
2See, for instance, Robert W. Wilson (1977), Edwin Mansﬁeld et al. (1979), Mansﬁeld and Anthony A. Romeo
(1980), and William H. Davidson and Donald G. McFetridge (1984, 1985). These studies will be discussed in more
detail in section III below.
3See Richard A. Jensen and Marie C. Thursby (1987), and Paul S. Segerstrom et al. (1990) for related theories of
endogenous product cycles.
4Grossman and Helpman (1991b) claimed that purposeful imitation was an important driving force in the transfer
of production of microprocessors from the United States and Japan to Taiwan and Korea. Based on recent studies,
I will argue below that even in the case of the electronics industry, the spectacular increase in the market share of
Korean producers might be better explained by technology transfer from foreign-based ﬁrms than by simple imitation
by domestic ﬁrms in Korea.
2North is assumed to have a high enough comparative advantage in product development so as
to ensure that this activity is always undertaken there. My speciﬁcation of technology diﬀers,
however, from that in Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) in that I treat product development as a
continuously active sector along the life cycle of a good. The concept of product development used
here is therefore quite broad and is meant to include, among others, the development of ideas for
improving existing products, as well as their marketing and advertising. Following Vernon (1966),
this speciﬁcation of technology enables me to capture the standardization process of a good along
its life cycle. More speciﬁcally, I assume that the contribution of product development to output
(as measured by the output elasticity of the hi-tech input) is inversely related to the age or maturity
of the good. Intuitively, the initial phases of a product’s life cycle entail substantial testing and
re-testing of prototypes as well as considerable marketing eﬀorts to make consumers aware of the
existence of the good. As the good matures and production techniques become standardized, the
mere assembly of the product becomes a much more signiﬁcant input in production.
Following Vernon (1966) and contrary to Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b), I allow Northern
ﬁrms to split the production process internationally and transact with manufacturing plants in the
South.5 With no frictions to the international fragmentation of the production process, I show
that the model fails to deliver a product cycle. Intuitively, provided that labor is paid a lower
wage in the South than in the North, manufacturing will be shifted to the South even for the
most unstandardized, product-development intensive goods. Vernon (1966) was well aware that
his theory required some type of friction that delayed oﬀshore assembly. In fact, he argued that in
the initial phase of a product’s life cycle, overseas production would be discouraged by a low price
elasticity of demand, the need for a thick market for inputs, and the need for swift and eﬀective
communication between producers and suppliers.
This paper will instead push the view that what limits the international fragmentation of
the production process is the incomplete nature of contracts governing international transactions.
Building on the seminal work of Oliver E. Williamson (1985) and Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart
(1986), I show that the presence of incomplete contracts creates hold-up problems, which in turn
give rise to suboptimal relationship-speciﬁc investments by the parties involved in an interna-
tional transaction. The product development manager of a Northern ﬁrm can alleviate this type
5There is a recent literature in international trade documenting an increasing international disintegration of the
production process (cf, Robert C. Feenstra, 1998; Kei-Mu Yi, 2003). A variety of terms have been used to refer to this
phenomenon: “international outsourcing”, “slicing of the value chain”, “vertical specialization”, “global production
sharing”, and many others. Feenstra (1998) discusses the widely cited example of Nike, which subcontracts most
parts of its production process to independent manufacturing plants in Asia.
3of distortions by keeping the manufacturing process in the North, where contracts can be better
enforced. In choosing between domestic and overseas manufacturing, the product development
manager therefore faces a trade-oﬀ between the lower costs of Southern manufacturing and the
higher incomplete-contracting distortions associated with it. This trade-oﬀ is shown to lead nat-
urally to the emergence of product cycles: when the good is new and unstandardized, Southern
production is very unattractive because it bears the full cost of incomplete contracting (which aﬀects
both the manufacturing and the product development stages of production) with little beneﬁtf r o m
the lower wage in the South. Conversely, when the good is mature and requires very little product
development, the beneﬁts from lower wages in the South fare much better against the distortions
from incomplete contracting, and if the Southern wage is low enough, the good is manufactured in
the South.
Following the property-rights approach to the theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and John H. Moore, 1990), the same force that creates product cycles in the model, i.e.,
incomplete contracts, opens the door to a parallel analysis of the determinants of ownership struc-
ture, which I carry out in section II. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), I associate ownership
with the entitlement of some residual rights of control. When parties undertake noncontractible,
relationship-speciﬁc investments, the allocation of these residual rights has a critical eﬀect on each
party’s ex-post outside option, which in turn determines each party’s ex-ante incentives to invest.
Ex-ante eﬃciency (i.e., transaction-cost minimization) is shown to dictate that residual rights be
controlled by the party whose investment contributes most to the value of the relationship. In
terms of the model, the attractiveness for a Northern product-development manager of integrating
the transfer of production to the South is shown to be increasing in the output elasticity of product
development, and thus decreasing in the maturity of the good at the time of the transfer.
As a result, a new version of the product cycle emerges. If the maturity at which manufacturing
is shifted to the South is low enough, production will be transferred internally to a wholly-owned
foreign aﬃliate in the South, and the Northern ﬁrm will become a multinational ﬁr m .I ns u c hc a s e ,
only at a later stage in the product’s life cycle will the product development manager ﬁnd it optimal
to give away the residual rights of control, and assign assembly to an independent subcontractor
in the South, an arrangement which is analogous to the Northern ﬁrm licensing its technology
(hi-tech input). For a higher maturity of the good at the time of the transfer, the model predicts
that the transfer to the South will occur directly at arm’s length, and multinationals will not arise.
In section III, I discuss several cross-sectional and time-series implications of the model and relate
4them to the empirical literature on the product cycle. For instance, the model is shown to be useful
for understanding the evolution of the Korean electronics industry after the Korean War.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I develops a simple dynamic model that
shows how the presence of incomplete contracts gives rise to product cycles. In section II, I allow
for intraﬁrm production transfers and describe the richer product life-cycle that emerges from it.
Section III reviews the ﬁndings of the empirical literature on the product cycle and relates them
to the predictions of the model. Section IV oﬀers some concluding comments.
I Incomplete Contracts and the Life Cycle of a Product
This section develops a simple model in which a product development manager decides how to
organize production of a particular good, taking the behavior of other producers as well as wages
as given. I will ﬁrst analyze the static problem, and then show how a product cycle emerges in a
simple dynamic extension in which the good gets standardized over time.
A. Set-up
Consider a world with two countries, the North and the South, and a single good y produced only
with labor. I denote the wage rate in the North by wN and that in the South by wS.C o n s u m e r
preferences are such that the unique producer of good y faces the following iso-elastic demand
function:
(1) y = λp−1/(1−α), 0 <α<1
where p is the price of the good and λ is a parameter that the producer takes as given.6
Production of good y requires the development of a special and distinct hi-tech input xh,a sw e l l
as the production of a special and distinct low-tech input xl. As discussed in the introduction, the
hi-tech input is meant to comprise research and product development, marketing, and other similar
skill-demanding tasks. The low-tech input is instead meant to capture the mere manufacturing or
assembly of the good. Specialized inputs can be of good or bad quality. If any of the two inputs is
of bad quality, the output of the ﬁnal good is zero. If both inputs are of good quality, production
6This demand function is derived from preferences in the general-equilibrium version of the model presented in
the Appendix.
5of the ﬁnal good requires no additional inputs and output is given by:
(2) y = ζzx1−z
h xz
l , 0 ≤ z ≤ 1,
where ζz = z−z (1 − z)
−(1−z).
The unit cost function for producing the hi-tech input varies by country. In the North, produc-
tion of one unit of a good-quality, hi-tech input requires the employment of one unit of Northern
labor. The South is much less eﬃcient at producing the hi-tech input. For simplicity, the produc-
tivity advantage of the North is assumed large enough to ensure that xh is only produced in the
North. Meanwhile, production of one unit of good-quality, low-tech input also requires labor, but
the unit input requirement is assumed to be equal to 1 in both countries. Production of any type
of bad-quality input can be undertaken at a positive but negligible cost. All types of inputs are
assumed to be freely tradable.
There are two types of producers: a research center and a manufacturing plant. A research
center is deﬁned as the producer of the hi-tech input and will thus always locate in the North. I
assume for now that the research center needs to contract with an independent manufacturing plant
for the provision of the low-tech input. In the next section, I will let the research center obtain the
low-tech input from an integrated plant.
As discussed in the introduction, I allow for an international fragmentation of the production
process. Before any investment is made, a research center decides whether to produce a hi-tech
input, and if so, whether to obtain the low-tech input from an independent manufacturing plant in
the North or from one in the South. Upon entry, the manufacturer makes a lump-sum transfer T to
the research center. Because, ex-ante, there is a large number of identical, potential manufacturers
of the good, competition among them will make T adjust so as to make the chosen manufacturer
break even.7 The research center chooses the location of manufacturing to maximize its ex-ante
proﬁts, which include the transfer.
Investments are assumed to be relationship-speciﬁc. The research center tailors the hi-tech
input speciﬁcally to the manufacturing plant, while the low-tech input is customized according to
the speciﬁc needs of the research center. In sum, the investments in labor needed to produce xh
and xl are incurred upon entry and are useless outside the relationship.
7When y is produced by the manufacturing plant, the transfer T can be interpreted as a lump-sum licensing fee
for the use of the hi-tech input. The presence of this transfer simpliﬁes the general-equilibrium model outlined in the
Appendix. For the results in the present section, it would suﬃce to assume that no ﬁrm is cash-constrained, so that
the equilibrium location of manufacturing maximizes the joint value of the relationship.
6The setting is one of incomplete contracts in situations of international production sharing. In
particular, it is assumed that only when both inputs are produced in the same country can an
outside party distinguish between a good-quality and a bad-quality intermediate input.8 Hence,
the manager of the research center and that of a Southern manufacturing plant cannot sign an
enforceable contract specifying the purchase of a certain type of intermediate input for a certain
price. If they did, the party receiving a positive payment would have an incentive to produce the
bad-quality input at the negligible cost. It is equally assumed that no outside party can verify the
amount of ex-ante investments in labor. If these were veriﬁable, the managers could contract on
them, and the cost-reducing beneﬁt of producing a bad-quality input would disappear. For the
same reason, it is assumed that the parties cannot write contracts contingent on the volume of
sale revenues obtained when the ﬁnal good is sold. The only contractible ex-ante is the transfer T
between the parties.9
When the research center chooses to transact with a manufacturing plant in the North, the fact
that labor investments are not contractible is irrelevant because the parties can always appeal to
an outside party to enforce quality-contingent contracts. In contrast, when the low-tech input is
produced by a plant in the South, no enforceable contract will be signed ex-ante and the two parties
will bargain over the surplus of the relationship after the inputs have been produced. At this point,
the quality of the inputs is observable to both parties and thus the costless bargaining will yield an
ex-post eﬃcient outcome. I model this ex-post bargaining as a Symmetric Nash Bargaining game
in which the parties share equally the ex-post gains from trade.10 Because the inputs are tailored
speciﬁcally to the other party in the transaction, if the two parties fail to agree on a division of the
surplus, both are left with nothing.
This completes the description of the model. The timing of events is summarized in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
B. Firm Behavior
8This can be interpreted as a physical constraint imposed on the outside party, which might not be able to verify
the quality of both inputs when these are produced in distant locations More generally, the assumption is meant
to capture broader contractual diﬃculties in international transactions, such as ambiguous jurisdiction, language
conﬂicts, or, more simply, weak protection of property rights in low-wage countries.
9I take the fact that contracts are incomplete as given. Philippe Aghion et al. (1994), Georg Nöldeke and Klaus
M. Schmidt (1995) and others, have shown that allowing for speciﬁc-performance contracts may lead to eﬃcient
ex-ante relationship-speciﬁc investments. Nevertheless, Yeon-Koo Che and Donald B. Hausch (1997) have identiﬁed
conditions under which speciﬁc-performance contracts do not lead to ﬁrst-best investment levels and may actually
have no value.
10In Antràs (2004), I extend the analysis to the case of Generalized Nash Bargaining.
7As discussed above, the North has a suﬃciently high productivity advantage in producing the hi-
tech input to ensure that xh is produced there. The decision of where to produce the low-tech
input is instead nontrivial. In his choice, the manager of the research center compares the ex-ante
proﬁts associated with two options, which I analyze in turn.
(a) Manufacturing by an Independent Plant in the North
Consider ﬁrst the case of a research center that decides to deal with an independent manufacturing
plant in the North. In that case, the two parties can write an ex-ante quality-contingent contract
that will not be renegotiated ex-post. The initial contract stipulates production of good-quality
inputs in an amount that maximizes the research center’s ex-ante proﬁts, which from equations (1)
and (2), and taking account of the transfer T,a r eg i v e nb yπN = λ1−αζα
zx
α(1−z)
h xαz
l −wNxh−wNxl.
It is straightforward to check that this program yields the following optimal price for the ﬁnal good:
pN (z)=
wN
α
.
Because the research center faces a constant elasticity of demand, the optimal price is equal to a
constant mark-up over marginal cost. Ex-ante proﬁts for the research center are in turn equal to
(3) πN (z)=( 1− α)λ
µ
wN
α
¶−α/(1−α)
.
(b) Manufacturing by an Independent Plant in the South
Consider next the problem faced by a research center that decides to transact with a plant in
the South. As discussed above, in this case the initial contract only stipulates the transfer T.T h e
game played by the manager of the research center and that of the manufacturing plant is solved by
backwards induction. If both producers make good-quality intermediate inputs and the ﬁrms agree
in the bargaining, the potential revenues from the sale of the ﬁnal good are R = λ1−αζα
zx
α(1−z)
h xαz
l .
In contrast, if the parties fail to agree in the bargaining, both are left with nothing. The quasi-rents
of the relationship are therefore equal to sale revenues, i.e., R. The Nash bargaining leaves each
manager with one-half of these quasi-rents. Rolling back in time, the research center manager sets
xh to maximize 1
2R−wNxh, while the manufacturing plant simultaneously chooses xl to maximize
1
2R − wSxl.11 Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions of these two programs yields the following
11It is easily checked that in equilibrium both parties receive a strictly positive ex-post payoﬀ from producing a
good-quality input. It follows that bad-quality inputs are never produced.
8optimal price for the ﬁnal good:
pS (z)=
2
¡
wN¢1−z ¡
wS¢z
α
.
If parties could write complete contracts in international transactions, the research center would
instead set a price equal to
¡
wN¢1−z ¡
wS¢z /α.T h eo v e r i n ﬂated price reﬂects the distortions arising
from incomplete contracting. Intuitively, because in the ex-post bargaining the parties fail to
capture the full marginal return to their investments, they will tend to underinvest in xh and xl.
As a result, output will tend to be suboptimal and the move along the demand function will also
be reﬂected in an ineﬃciently high price.
Setting T so as to make the manufacturing plant break even leads to the following expression
for the research center’s ex-ante proﬁts:
(4) πS (z)=
µ
1 −
1
2
α
¶
λ
Ã
2
¡
wN¢1−z ¡
wS¢z
α
!−α/(1−α)
.
C. The Equilibrium Choice
From comparison of equations (3) and (4), it follows that the low-tech input will be produced in
the South only if A(z) ≤ ω ≡ wN/wS,w h e r e
(5) A(z) ≡
Ã
1 − α
¡
1 − 1
2α
¢¡1
2
¢α/(1−α)
!(1−α)/αz
.
It is straightforward to show that A(z) is non-increasing in z for z ∈ [0,1],w i t hlimz→0 A(z)=+ ∞
and A(1) > 1.12 This implies that (i) for high enough product-development intensities of the ﬁnal
good, manufacturing is necessarily assigned to a manufacturing plant in the North; and (ii) unless
the wage in the North is higher than that in the South, manufacturing by an independent plant
in the South will never be chosen. Intuitively, the beneﬁts of Southern assembly are able to oﬀset
the distortions created by incomplete contracting only when the manufacturing stage is suﬃciently
important in production or when the wage in the South is suﬃciently lower than that in the North.
To make matters interesting, I assume that:
Assumption 1: ω>A(1) > 1.
12This follows from the fact that (1 − αx)x
α/(1−α) is increasing in x for α ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1).
9In Antràs (2004), I show that this condition necessarily holds in a simple general-equilibrium
extension of the model, in which the relative wage ω is endogenously pinned down. Intuitively, in
the general equilibrium the relative wage in the North necessarily adjusts to ensure positive labor
demand in the South. This extension is brieﬂy outlined in the Appendix. A salient feature of
the analysis is that as long as contracts governing international transactions are incomplete, the
equilibrium wage in the North necessarily exceeds that in the South.13
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Assumption 1 ensures that πN (z) <π S (z) for suﬃciently high z ∈ [0,1]. Figure 2 depicts the
proﬁt-maximizing choice of location as a function of z. It is apparent that:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique threshold ¯ z ∈ (0,1) such that the low-tech
input is produced in the North if z<¯ z ≡ A−1(ω), while it is produced in the South if z>¯ z ≡
A−1(ω),w h e r eA(z) is given by equation (5) and ω i st h er e l a t i v ew a g ei nt h eN o r t h .
From direct inspection of Figure 2, it is clear that an increase in the relative wage in the North
reduces the threshold ¯ z. Intuitively, an increase in ω makes Southern manufacturing relatively more
proﬁtable and leads to a reduction in the measure of product-development intensities for which the
whole production process stays in the North.
D. Dynamics: The Product Cycle
As discussed in the introduction, one of the premises of Vernon’s (1966) original product-cycle
hypothesis is that as a good matures throughout its life cycle, it becomes more and more standard-
ized.14 Vernon believed that the unstandardized nature of new goods was crucial for understanding
that they would be ﬁrst produced in a high-wage country.
To capture this standardization process in a simple way, consider the following simple dynamic
extension of the static model developed above. Time is continuous, indexed by t,w i t ht ∈ [0,∞).
Consumers are inﬁnitely lived and, at any t ∈ [0,∞), their preferences for good y are captured
13Another appealing characteristic of the general-equilibrium analysis is that the cross-sectional picture that
emerges from the model is very similar to that in the classical Ricardian model with a continuum of goods of
Rudiger Dornbusch et al. (1977).
14In discussing previous empirical studies on the location of industry, Vernon wrote: “in the early stages of intro-
duction of a new good, producers were usually confronted with a number of critical, albeit transitory, conditions.
For one thing, the product itself may be quite unstandardized for a time; its inputs, its processing, and its ﬁnal
speciﬁcations may cover a wide range. Contrast the great variety of automobiles produced and marketed before 1910
with the thoroughly standardized product of the 1930s, or the variegated radio designs of the 1920s with the uniform
models of the 1930s.” (Vernon, 1966, p. 197).
10by the demand function (1). The relative wage ω is assumed to be time-invariant.15 The output
elasticity of the low-tech input is instead assumed to increase through time. In particular, this
elasticity is given by
z(t)=h(t),w i t hh0(t) > 0,h (0) = 0, and lim
t→∞
h(t)=1 .
I therefore assume that the product-development intensity of the good is inversely related to its
maturity. Following the discussion in the introduction, this is meant to capture the idea that most
goods require a lot of R&D and product development in the early stages of their life cycle, while
the mere assembling or manufacturing becomes a much more signiﬁcant input in production as the
good matures. I will take these dynamics as given, but it can be shown that, under Assumption
1, proﬁts for the Northern research center are weakly increasing in z. It follows that the smooth
process of standardization speciﬁed here could, in principle, be derived endogenously in a richer
framework that incorporated some costs of standardization.16 Finally, I assume that the structure
of ﬁrms is such that when Southern assembly is chosen, the game played by the two managers can
be treated as a static one and we can abstract from an analysis of reputational equilibria. This is a
warranted assumption when the separation rate for managers is high enough or when future proﬁt
streams are suﬃciently discounted.
With this simpliﬁed, dynamic set-up, the cut-oﬀ level ¯ z ≡ A−1(ω) is time-invariant, and the
following result is a straightforward implication of Lemma 1:
Proposition 1 The model displays a product cycle. When the good is relatively new or unstan-
dardized, i.e., t ≤ h−1 (¯ z), the manufacturing stage of production takes place in the North. When
the good is relatively mature or standardized, i.e., t>h −1 (¯ z), manufacturing is undertaken in the
South.
Consider, for instance, the following speciﬁcation of the standardization process:
z(t)=h(t)=1− e−t/θ,
where 1/θ m e a s u r e st h er a t ea tw h i c h1−z falls towards zero, i.e., the rate of standardization. With
15The latter assumption is relaxed in the general equilibrium version of the model developed in Antràs (2004) and
sketched in the Appendix.
16For instance, if such costs were increasing in dz/dt, then a discrete increase in z would be inﬁnitely costly. A full
ﬂedged modeling of the standardization decision is left for future research.
11this functional form, the whole production process remains in the North until the product reaches
an age equal to θln
³
1
1−¯ z
´
, at which point manufacturing is shifted to the South. Naturally,
production of the low-tech input is transferred to the South earlier, the higher is the speed of
standardization, 1/θ, and the lower is the threshold intensity ¯ z. Furthermore, because the cut-oﬀ
¯ z is itself a decreasing function of ω, it follows that the higher is the relative wage in the North,
the earlier will production transfer occur.17
As argued in the introduction, the fact that international contracts are not perfectly enforceable
is important for product cycles to emerge. To illustrate this, consider the case in which the quality
of intermediate inputs were veriﬁable by an outside court even in international transactions, so
that the manager of the research center and that of the Southern manufacturing plant could also
write enforceable contracts. It is straightforward to check that, in such case, proﬁts for the research
center would be πS(z)=( 1− α)λ
³¡
wN¢1−z ¡
wS¢z /α
´−α/(1−α)
. Comparing this expression with
equation (3), it follows that assembly in the South would be chosen only if ω ≥ 1 (this is the analog
of Assumption 1 above). If ω>1,p r o ﬁts would satisfy πN(z) ≤ πS(z) for all z ∈ [0,1], with strict
inequality for z>0. The production process would therefore be broken up from time 0 and no
product cycles would arise. If instead ω =1 , πN(z) and πS(z) would be identical for all z ∈ [0,1]
and the location of manufacturing would be indeterminate, in which case product cycles would
emerge with probability zero.
Arguably, incomplete contracting is just one of several potential frictions that would make
manufacturing stay in the North for a period of time. It is important to emphasize, however, that
not any type of friction would give rise to product cycles in the model. The fact that incomplete
contracts distort both the manufacturing stage and the product development stage in production
is of crucial importance. For instance, introducing a transport cost or a communication cost that
created ineﬃciencies only in the provision of the low-tech input would not suﬃce to give rise to
product cycles in the model. In this paper, I choose to emphasize the role of incomplete contracts
because they are an important source of frictions in the real world and, also, because they are
a very useful theoretical tool for understanding ﬁrm boundaries, which are the focus of the next
section. The type of organizational cycles unveiled by the empirical literature on the product cycle
could not easily be rationalized in theoretical frameworks in which production transfer to low-
17Vernon (1966) hypothesized instead that before being transferred to low-wage countries, production would ﬁrst be
located in middle-income countries for a period of time. An important point to notice is that in doing the comparative
statics with respect to ω, I have held the contracting environment constant. Recent empirical studies suggest that
countries with better legal systems tend to have higher levels of per-capita income (Robert E. Hall and Charles I.
Jones, 1999; Daron Acemoglu et al., 2001). If I allowed for this type of correlation in the model, production might
not be transferred earlier, the higher ω.
12wage countries was delayed merely by transport costs or communication costs.18 Instead, they will
emerge naturally in the extension below.
II Firm Boundaries and the Product Cycle
Consider next the same set-up as in the previous section with the following new feature. The
research center is now given the option of vertically integrating the manufacturing plant and,
i nt h ec a s eo fS o u t h e r na s s e m b ly, becoming a multinational ﬁrm. Following the property-rights
approach of the theory of ﬁrm, vertical integration has the beneﬁt of strengthening the ex-post
bargaining power of the integrating party (the research center), but the cost of reducing the ex-post
bargaining power of the integrated party (the manufacturing plant). In particular, by integrating
the production of the low-tech input, the manager of the manufacturing plant becomes an employee
of the research center manager. This implies that if the manufacturing plant manager refuses to
trade after the sunk costs have been incurred, the research center manager now has the option
of ﬁring the overseas manager and seizing the amount of xl produced. As in Grossman and Hart
(1986), ownership is identiﬁed with the residual rights of control over certain assets. In this case,
the low-tech input plays the role of this asset.19
If there were no costs associated with ﬁring the manufacturing plant manager, there would
be no surplus to bargain over after production, and the manufacturing plant manager would ex-
ante optimally set xl =0(which of course would imply y =0 ). In that case, integration would
never be chosen. To make things more interesting, I assume that ﬁring the manufacturing plant
manager results in a negative productivity shock that leads to a loss of a fraction 1−δ of ﬁnal-good
production. Under this assumption, the surplus of the relationship remains positive even under
integration. I take the fact that δ is strictly less than one as given, but this assumption could be
rationalized in a richer framework.20
The rest of this section is structured as follows. I will ﬁrst revisit the static, partial-equilibrium
model developed in section I. Next, I will analyze the dynamics of the model and discuss the
implications of vertical integration for this new view of the product cycle.
18To illustrate this point, consider the case in which the Northern productivity advantage in product development
is bounded and the production process cannot be fragmented across borders (e.g., because of prohibitive transport
costs or communication costs). Under these circumstances, the whole production process would shift from the North
to the South at some point along the life-cycle of the good, but the model would deliver no predictions for the dynamic
organizational structure of ﬁrms.
19See Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) for related set-ups.
20The fact that the fraction of ﬁnal-good production lost is independent of z simpliﬁes the analysis but is not
necesary for the qualitative results discussed below.
13A. Firm Behavior
In section I.B, I computed ex-ante proﬁts for the research center under two possible modes of
organization: (a) manufacturing by an independent plant in the North; and (b) manufacturing by
an independent plant in the South. The possibility of vertical integration introduces two additional
options: manufacturing by a vertically integrated plant in the North and manufacturing by a
vertically integrated plant in the South. Because contracts are assumed to be perfectly enforceable
in transactions involving two ﬁrms located in the same country, it is straightforward to show that
the ﬁrst of these new options yields ex-ante proﬁts identical to those in case (a). As is well known
from the property-rights literature, in a world of complete contracts, ownership structure is both
indeterminate and irrelevant. In contrast, when Southern assembly is chosen, the assignment of
residual rights is much more interesting.
(c) Manufacturing by a Vertically-Integrated Plant in the South
Consider then the problem faced by a research center and its integrated manufacturing plant in
the South. If both managers decide to make good-quality intermediate inputs and they agree in the
bargaining, the potential revenues from the sale of the ﬁnal good are again R = λ1−αζα
zx
α(1−z)
h xαz
l .
In contrast, if the parties fail to agree in the bargaining, the product-development manager will ﬁre
the manufacturing plant manager, who will be left with nothing. The research center will instead
be able to sell an amount δy of output, which using equation (1) will translate into sale revenues
of δαR. The quasi-rents of the relationship are therefore given by (1 − δα)R. Symmetric Nash
bargaining leaves each party with its default option plus one-half of the quasi-rents. The research
center therefore sets xh to maximize 1
2 (1 + δα)R−wNxh, while the Southern manufacturing plant
simultaneously chooses xl to maximize 1
2 (1 − δα)R − wSxl. Relative to case (b) in section I,
integration enhances the research center’s incentives to invest (1
2 (1 + δα) > 1
2) but, at the same
time, it reduces the manufacturing plant’s incentives to invest. Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions
of these two programs yields the following optimal price for the ﬁnal good:
pS
M (z)=
2
¡
wN¢1−z ¡
wS¢z
α(1 + δα)
1−z (1 − δα)
z.
Incomplete contracting again distorts the optimal price charged for the ﬁnal good. Notice, however,
that in this case the distortions are higher, the higher is z. Setting T so as to make the integrated
manufacturing plant break even leads to the following expression for the research center’s ex-ante
14proﬁts:
(6) πS
M (z)=
µ
1 −
1
2
α(1 + δα (1 − 2z))
¶
λ
Ã
2
¡
wN¢1−z ¡
wS¢z
α(1 + δα)
1−z (1 − δα)
z
!−α/(1−α)
,
where the subscript M reﬂects the fact that the research center becomes a multinational ﬁrm under
this arrangement.
B. The Equilibrium Choice Revisited
The product manager will now choose the manufacturing location and ownership structure that
maximize proﬁts for a given z.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the choice between Northern assembly and Southern
assembly by an independent ﬁrm. This was analyzed in section I, where I showed that under
Assumption 1, there exists a unique ¯ z = A−1 (ω) such that πN (z) >π S (z) for z<¯ z,a n d
πN (z) <π S (z) for z>¯ z.
Consider next the choice between Northern assembly and Southern assembly by an integrated
ﬁrm. Comparing equations (3) and (6), it follows that πS
M (z) ≥ πN (z) only if AM(z) ≤ ω,w h e r e
(7) AM(z)=
Ã
1 − α
1 − 1
2α(1 + δα (1 − 2z))
!(1−α)/αz µ
2
(1 + δα)
1−z (1 − δα)
z
¶1/z
.
In the Appendix, I show that limz→0 AM(z)=+ ∞ and AM (z) > 1 for all z ∈ [0,1].A sw i t h
the comparison involving arm’s length production transfers, when the low-tech input is not very
important in production, the cost-saving beneﬁt of producing it in the South is outweighed by the
costs of incomplete contracting, which distort the marginal cost of production of both the hi-tech
and the low-tech inputs.21 It thus follows from this discussion that, as in section I, the low-tech
input will again be produced in the North whenever z is suﬃciently low, that is, whenever the good
is suﬃciently unstandardized.
Consider next the choice between Southern assembly by an independent ﬁrm (or outsourcing)
and Southern assembly by an integrated ﬁrm (or insourcing). It is straightforward to check that
insourcing will dominate outsourcing whenever AM(z) <A (z), while outsourcing will dominate
21Crucial for this result is the fact that, following Grossman and Hart (1986), and contrary to the older transaction-
cost literature, vertical integration does not eliminate the opportunistic behavior at the heart of the hold-up problem.
Integration, however, aﬀects the allocation of power in the relationship and this explains why AM (z) is diﬀerent from
A(z) in equation (5).
15insourcing whenever AM(z) >A(z).22 Furthermore, the following result — analogous to Proposition
1 in Antràs (2003) — is proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 2 There exists a unique cutoﬀ ¯ zMS ∈ (0,1) such that AM(¯ zMS)=A(¯ zMS).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
AM(z) <A(z) for 0 <z<¯ zMS,a n dAM(z) >A(z) for ¯ zMS <z≤ 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This implies that there exists a unique cutoﬀ ¯ zMS such that insourcing dominates outsourcing
for all z<¯ zMS, with the converse being true for z>¯ zMS. The logic of this result lies at the
heart of Grossman and Hart’s (1986) seminal contribution. When contracts governing transactions
are incomplete, ex-ante eﬃciency dictates that residual rights should be controlled by the party
undertaking a relatively more important investment in a relationship. If production of the ﬁnal good
requires mostly product development (i.e., z is low), the investment made by the manufacturing
plant manager will be relatively small, and thus it will be optimal to assign the residual rights of
control to the research center. Conversely, when the low-tech input is important in production,
the research center will optimally choose to tilt the bargaining power in favor of the manufacturing
plant by giving away these same residual rights.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 illustrates this point by depicting the amounts of inputs produced under each or-
ganizational mode, as well as those prevailing under complete contracting. The curves M∗ and
R∗ represent the reaction functions x∗
h(xl) and x∗
l (xh) under complete contracts, with the cor-
responding equilibrium at point A. Similarly, B and C depict the incomplete-contract equilibria
corresponding to arm’s length transacting and vertical integration, respectively. It is clear from
the graph that incomplete contracting leads to underproduction of both xh and xl. The crucial
point to notice from Figure 3, however, is that because the manufacturing plant has relatively less
bargaining power under integration, the underproduction in xl is relatively higher under integration
than under outsourcing. Furthermore, the more important is the low-tech input in production, the
more value-reducing will the underinvestment in xl be. It thus follows that proﬁts under integration
relative to those under outsourcing will tend to be lower, the more important is the low-tech input
in production (i.e., the higher z).
A corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2 is that, as in section I, when z is suﬃciently high (i.e., when
z>max{¯ z,¯ zMS}), the low-tech input will again be produced in the South by a nonintegrated
22This follows directly from A(z)=ω ·

π
N (z)/π
S (z)
(1−α)/αz
and AM (z)=ω ·

π
N (z)/π
S
M (z)
(1−α)/αz
.
16manufacturing plant. Remember also that we have established that for suﬃciently low z,t h el o w -
tech input is necessarily produced in the North. It remains to analyze what happens for intermediate
values of z, where multinational ﬁrms may potentially arise.
Notice ﬁrst that if AM (z) >ωfor all z ∈ [0,1], Northern assembly strictly dominates Southern
insourcing for all z ∈ [0,1] and multinational ﬁrms do not emerge. Furthermore, in such case, the
choice between Northern assembly and foreign outsourcing is identical to that in section I.23 Let
us therefore focus on the case in which AM (z) <ωfor some z ∈ [0,1]. This analysis is simpliﬁed
by assuming that δ is not too high, which ensures that the function AM(z) is a decreasing function
of z for all z ∈ [0,1].24 As shown in the Appendix, a suﬃcient condition for this to be the case is:
Assumption 2: δα ≤ 1/2.
Under Assumption 2, there exists a unique cutoﬀ ¯ zMN = A−1
M (ω) ∈ (0,1) such that πN (z) >
πS
M (z) for z<¯ zMN,a n dπN (z) <π S
M (z) for z>¯ zMN. This in turn implies that the low-tech
input will be produced in the North only if z<min{¯ z,¯ zMN}. Furthermore, it is easily veriﬁed
that the three thresholds ¯ z, ¯ zMN,a n d¯ zMS must satisfy one of the following: (i) ¯ zMS =¯ z =¯ zMN,
(ii) ¯ zMS < ¯ z<¯ zMN, or (iii) ¯ zMN < ¯ z<¯ zMS.25
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4 is instructive in understanding this result. The ﬁgure depicts the curves A(z) and
AM(z), which under Assumption 2, are both decreasing in z. Lemma 2 ensure that these curves
intersect just once and that A(z) >A M(z) i fa n do n l yi fz<¯ zMS. For any relative wage ω,i t
is clear that either ¯ zMS < ¯ z<¯ zMN (left panel) or ¯ zMN < ¯ z<¯ zMS (right panel). The case
¯ zMS =¯ z =¯ zMN occurs with probability zero and will be ignored hereafter.
As indicated in both panels in Figure 4, for a low enough value for z, the beneﬁts from Southern
assembly are too low relative to the distortions from incomplete contracting, and xl is produced
in the North. Furthermore, for a suﬃciently high value of z,ap r o ﬁt-maximizing research center
will decide to outsource the manufacturing input to an independent manufacturing plant in the
South. Whether for intermediate values of z the research center becomes a multinational ﬁrm or
23In particular, because A(¯ zMS)=AM (¯ zMS) >ωand given that A
0 (z) < 0,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t¯ z>¯ zMS,
and thus the equilibrium is as described in Lemma 1.
24The AM(z) curve is decreasing in z for low values of z even when δ approaches one. Assumption 2 rules out cases
in which AM(z) might tilt up for high values of z. Such cases are discussed in the Appendix. The results are very
similar with the exception that under certain parameter values, the model may feature more complex product-cycle
dynamics.
25To see this, notice for instance that zMS < z if and only if both A(zMS) >ωand A(z) <A M(z). But the latter
can only be true if A(z)/AM(z)=ω/AM(z) < 1, which implies z<zMN.
17not depends on parameter values. If ¯ zMS < ¯ z<¯ zMN, then there exists no z ∈ [0,1] for which
πS
M (z) > max
©
πN (z),πS (z)
ª
, and multinational ﬁrms do not arise in equilibrium. Conversely, if
¯ zMN < ¯ z<¯ zMS, multinational ﬁrms can arise provided that z ∈ [¯ zMN, ¯ zMS].T os u m m a r i z et h e
results of this section,
Lemma 3 If ¯ zMS < min{¯ z,¯ zMN}, the low-tech input in the North for z<¯ z, and in the South by
an unaﬃliated party for z>¯ z.I fi n s t e a d¯ zMS > min{¯ z,¯ zMN}, the low-tech input is produced in
the North for z<¯ zMN,i nt h eS o u t hb ya na ﬃliated party if ¯ zMN <z<¯ zMS, and in the South by
an unaﬃliated party if z>¯ zMS.
C. Dynamics: The Product Cycle
Consider now the dynamics developed in section I and assume that δ is also time-invariant, implying
that not only ¯ z, but also ¯ zMN and ¯ zMS are constant through time. The following is a straightforward
corollary of Lemma 3:
Proposition 2 The model displays a product cycle. If ¯ zMS < min{¯ z,¯ zMN},t h ep r o d u c tc y c l ei s
as described in Proposition 1. If instead ¯ zMS > min{¯ z,¯ zMN}, the following product cycle emerges.
When the good is relatively new, i.e., t<h −1 (¯ zMN), the manufacturing stage of production takes
place in the North. For an intermediate maturity of the good, h−1 (¯ zMN) <t<h −1 (¯ zMS),m a n -
ufacturing is shifted to the South but is undertaken within ﬁrm boundaries. When the good is
relatively standardized, i.e., t>h −1 (¯ zMS), production is shifted to an unaﬃliated party in the
South.
This is the central result of this paper. It states that if the threshold maturity level min{¯ z,¯ zMN}
at which manufacturing is shifted to the South is high enough, the transfer of production will occur
at arm’s length and multinationals will not emerge in equilibrium. Conversely, if this threshold
maturity level is low enough, manufacturing will be shifted to the South within the boundaries
of the Northern ﬁrm by establishing a wholly-owned foreign aﬃliate. In that case, arm’s length
assembly in the South will only be observed at a later stage in the life cycle of the good. The model
may thus generate both endogenous product cycles as well as endogenous organizational cycles.
III Empirical Evidence
This section reviews some implications of this extended version of the model and contrasts them
with the ﬁndings of the empirical literature on the product cycle. For simplicity, I will mostly focus
18on the case in which ¯ zMS > min{¯ z,¯ zMN}, so that the model features both intraﬁrm as well as
arm’s-length production transfers.
Consider ﬁrst the time-series implications of the model. These are well summarized by Propo-
sition 2. The model predicts that industries will emerge in low-wage countries only with some lag.
Furthermore, the model predicts that in the initial phases of the presence of the industry in the
South, foreign direct investment from rich countries should constitute an important part of the
industry. Eventually, unaﬃliated domestic producers should gain the bulk of the Southern market
share, but importantly the model predicts that foreign licensing should still play an important role
in those later phases.
The model is consistent with the evolution of the Korean electronics industry from the early
1960s to the late 1980s.26 In the early 1960s, Korean electronic ﬁrms were producing mostly low-
quality consumer electronics for their domestic market. The industry took oﬀ in the late 1960s
with the establishment of a few large U.S. assembly plants, almost all wholly owned, followed
in the early 1970s by substantial Japanese investments.27 These foreign subsidiaries tended to
assemble components exclusively for export using imported parts. In this initial phase, foreign
aﬃliates were responsible for 71 percent of exports in electronics, with the percentage reaching 97
percent for the case of exports of integrated circuits and transistors, and 100 percent for memory
planes and magnetic heads. In the 1970s and 1980s domestic Korean ﬁrms progressively gained a
much larger market share, but the strengthening of domestic electronic companies was accompanied
by a considerable expansion of technology licensing from foreign ﬁrms. Indeed, as late as 1988, 60
percent of Korean electronic exports were recorded as part of an Original Equipment Manufacturing
(OEM) transaction.28 The percentage approached 100 percent in the case of exports of computer
terminals and telecommunications equipment. Korean giants such as Samsung or Goldstar were
heavily dependent on foreign licenses and OEM agreements even up to the late 1980s.29
At a more micro level, several cross-sectional implications of the model are consistent with the
ﬁndings of the empirical literature on the product cycle. To see this, imagine attempting to test
26The following discussion is based on Martin Bloom (1992), UNCTAD (1995, pp. 251-253), and Jin W. Cyhn
(2002).
27Motorola established a production plant in Korea in 1968. Other U.S. based multinationals establishing sub-
sidiaries in Korea during this period include Signetics, Fairchild and Control Data.
28OEM is a form of subcontracting which as Cyhn’s (2002) writes “occurs when a company arranges for an item
to be produced with its logo or brand name on it, even though that company is not the producer”.
29As pointed out by a referee, a caveat in mapping Proposition 2 with the evolution of the Korean electronics
industry is that, during this period, Korean wages were growing faster than U.S. wages (i.e., ω was steadily fall).
Notice, however, that because ¯ zMS is independent of ω, the model would still predict the simple three-stage product
cycle provided that ω does not fall at a rate faster than A(z) and AM (z), as would be the case if the good standardizes
at a suﬃciently fast rate.
19the model with data on a cross-section of production transfers. The model would then predict that
the probability of a particular transfer occurring within ﬁrm boundaries should be decreasing in
the maturity of the product at the time of the transfer. This maturity should in turn be negatively
correlated with the age of the product and positively correlated with both its R&D intensity as
well as with its speed of standardization.
Mansﬁeld and Romeo (1980) analyzed 65 technology transfers by 31 U.S.-based ﬁrms in a
variety of industries. They found that, on average, U.S.-based ﬁrms tended to transfer technologies
internally to their subsidiaries within 6 years of their introduction in the United States. The
average lag for technologies that were transferred through licensing or through a joint venture was
instead 13 years. Similarly, after surveying R&D executives of 30 U.S. based multinational ﬁrms,
Mansﬁeld, Romeo, and Wagner (1979) concluded that for young technologies (less than 5 years
old), internal technology transfer tended to be preferred to licensing, whereas for more mature
technologies (between 5 and 10 years), licensing became a much more attractive choice.30
In more detailed studies, Davidson and McFetridge (1984, 1985) looked at 1,376 internal and
arm’s-length transactions involving high-technology products carried out by 32 US.-based multina-
tional enterprises between 1945 and 1975. Their logit estimates indicated that the probability of
internalization was indeed higher the newer and more radical was a technology and the larger was
the fraction of the transferor’s resources devoted to scientiﬁcR & D .
There is also some evidence that the probability of internalization might be decreasing in the
speed of standardization. Using a sample of 350 US ﬁrms, Wilson (1977) indeed concluded that
licensing was more attractive the less complex was the good involved, with his measure of complexity
being positively correlated with the amount of R&D undertaken for its production. In their study
of the transfer of 35 Swedish innovations, Bruce M. Kogut and Udo B. Zander (1993) similarly
found that the probability of internalization was lower the more codiﬁable and teachable and the
less complex was the technology.
The dataset used by Davidson and McFetridge (1985) also includes information on the char-
acteristics of the country receiving the transfer. The model predicts that an equilibrium with
multinational ﬁr m si sm o r el i k e l yt h eh i g h e ri s¯ zMS relative to the other two thresholds ¯ z and ¯ zMN.
In section I, I showed that ¯ z is a decreasing function of the relative wage ω. By way of implicit
30In the previous case of the Korean electronics industry, there is also some evidence that “Northern” ﬁrms did not
license their leading edge technologies to their Korean licensees. For instance, in 1986, Hitachi licensed to Goldstar
the technology to produce the 1-megabyte Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chip, when at the same time
it was shifting to the 4-megabyte DRAM chip. Similarly, Phillips licensed the production of CD players to ten Korean
producers, while keeping within ﬁrm boundaries the assembly of their deck mechanisms.
20diﬀerentiation, and making use of Assumption 2, one can show that ¯ zMN is also decreasing in
ω. The choice between an independent and an integrated Southern supplier, as captured by the
threshold ¯ zMS is instead unaﬀected by the relative wage in the North.31 It thus follows that in a
cross-section of production transfers, the probability of internalization should be decreasing in the
labor costs of the recipient country. This prediction is consistent with the ﬁndings of Davidson and
McFetridge (1985). In their sample of 1,376 transfers, they found that a higher GNP per capita of
the recipient country (arguably, a proxy for ω in the model) was associated with a lower probabil-
ity of internalization. Importantly, their results are robust to controlling for several institutional
characteristics of the recipient country (remember the discussion in footnote 17).32
One further implication of the model is that relative to the case in which only arm’s length
transactions are permitted, the emergence of intraﬁrm production transfer by multinational ﬁrms
accelerates the shift of production towards the South (remember that ¯ zMN < ¯ z whenever multina-
tional ﬁrms are active in the model). This result ﬁts well Theodore H. Moran’s (2001) recent study
of the eﬀects of domestic-content, joint-venture, and technology-sharing mandates on production
transfer to developing countries. Plants in host countries that impose such restrictions, he writes,
“utilize older technology, and suﬀer lags in the introduction of newer processes and products in
comparison to wholly owned subsidiaries without such requirements” (p. 32). He also describes an
interesting case study. In 1998, Eastman Kodak agreed to set up joint ventures with three desig-
nated Chinese partners. These joint ventures specialized in producing conventional ﬁlms under the
Kodak name. When the Chinese government allowed Kodak to establish a parallel wholly owned
plant, Kodak shifted to this aﬃliate the manufacturing of the latest digitalized ﬁlm and camera
products (p. 36).
IV Conclusions
This paper has presented a dynamic model featuring both endogenous product cycles and endoge-
nous organizational cycles. It has been argued that the same forces that make ﬁrms choose to
manufacture their new goods in high-wage countries can explain why, when they decide to transfer
production to low-wage countries, they might choose to do so inside their ﬁrm boundaries.
31This follows directly from the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology and isolates the partial-equilibrium decision
to integrate or outsource from any potential general-equilibrium feedbacks. This implied block-recursiveness is a useful
property for solving the general equilibrium version of the model outlined in the Appendix, but the results should be
robust to more general speciﬁcations of technology.
32In parallel work using aggregate industry data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Farok J. Contractor
(1984) found similar results.
21In contrast to previous theories of the multinational ﬁrm, ﬁrm boundaries were not drawn ap-
pealing to technological considerations, such as economies of scale or transport costs.33 As in Antràs
(2003), I instead set forth a purely organizational, property-rights model of the multinational ﬁrm.34
Multinational ﬁrms emerged in equilibrium whenever transaction-cost minimization dictated that
certain goods would be transacted more eﬃciently within ﬁrm boundaries than at arm’s length.
Relative to a world with only arm’s length transacting, I showed that foreign direct investment
might help alleviate contractual frictions in global production sharing, thereby anticipating the
transfer of certain stages of the production to low-wage countries.
The simple model developed here has proven to be a useful lens through which to interpret
several ﬁndings in the international business literature. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. For
instance, the present framework has abstracted from at least one important channel of production
transfer, namely, imitation. Future eﬀorts should also be directed at incorporating elements of
alternative theories of the ﬁrm to the study of international patterns of specialization.
33This previous literature builds on the seminal work of Helpman (1984) and James R. Markusen (1984), and is
extensively reviewed in Richard E. Caves (1996) and Markusen (1995). Wilfred J. Ethier (1986), Ethier and Markusen
(1996), and Amy J. Glass and Kamal Saggi (2002) study the choice between foreign direct investment and licensing,
but in frameworks in which the internalization decision is unrelated to the allocation of some residual rights of control.
34This paper is related to an emerging literature on general-equilibrium models of ownership structure (c.f., John
E. McLaren, 2000, Grossman and Helpman, 2002, Antràs, 2003, Antràs and Helpman, 2004). In Antràs (2003), I
unveiled two systematic patterns in the volume of intraﬁrm trade, which I then rationalized in a theoretical framework
that combined a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the ﬁrm with a Helpman-Krugman view of international trade. The
model was extended in Antràs and Helpman (2004) to account for intraindustry heterogeneity in organizational
choices.
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A. Some Properties of AM(z)
Here I provide a formal proof that limz→0 AM(z)=+ ∞ and that AM (z) > 1 for all z ∈ [0,1].I t i s
convenient to start deﬁning φ = 1
2 (1 + δ
α) so that
AM(z)=
µ
1 − α
(1 − α(φ(1 − z)+( 1− φ)z))
¡
φ
1−z (1 − φ)
z¢−α/(1−α)
¶(1−α)/αz
Now notice that limz→0 AM(z)=+ ∞ provided that 1−α
(1−αφ)φα/(1−α) > 1, but this is implied by the
fact that (1 − αx)xα/(1−α) is increasing in x for α ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1).N e x t ,I s h o w t h a t Γ(α,φ,z)=
[AM(z)]
αz/(1−α) > 1 for all z ∈ [0,1], which immediately implies AM (z) > 1 for all z ∈ [0,1].S i n c e
Γ(0,φ,z)=1 ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that ∂Γ(α,φ,z)/∂α > 0 for all α ∈ (0,1), φ ∈ (0,1),a n dz ∈ [0,1].
But simple diﬀerentiation reveals that ∂Γ(α,φ,z)/∂α > 0 if and only if
ln
µ
1
φ
1−z (1 − φ)
z
¶
> (1 − α)
µ
1 − φ(1 − z) − (1 − φ)z
1 − α(φ(1 − z)+( 1− φ)z)
¶
.
The right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in α, so all we need to show is that
g(z)=l n
µ
1
φ
1−z (1 − φ)
z
¶
− (1 − φ(1 − z) − (1 − φ)z) > 0.
But since g(z) is linear in z, it follows that g(z) ≥ min{g(0),g(1)}. Finally note that for φ ∈ (0,1),b o t h
g(0) = ln
³
1
φ
´
− 1+φ>0 and g(1) = ln
³
1
1−φ
´
− φ>0. Hence, g(z) > 0.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Let Θ(z)=( AM(z)/A (z))
z, which using equations (5) and (7) simpliﬁes to
Θ(z)=
µ
1 − 1
2α
1 − 1
2α(1 + δ (1 − 2z))
¶(1−α)/α Ã
1
(1 + δ)
1−z (1 − δ)
z
!
.
Straightforward algebra delivers that Θ0 (z) > 0 if and only if
ln
µ
1+δ
α
1 − δ
α
¶
>
(1 − α)δ
α
1 − 1
2α(1 + δ
α (1 − 2z))
.
The right hand side is decreasing in z and is therefore no larger than (1 − α)δ
α/
¡
1 − 1
2α(1 + δ
α)
¢
,w h i c hi n
turn can be shown to be smaller than ln[(1 + δ
α)/(1 − δ
α)]. To see this last statement, simply deﬁne the
23function ϑ(δ)=l n [ ( 1+δ
α)/(1 − δ
α)] − (1 − α)δ
α/
¡
1 − 1
2α(1 + δ
α)
¢
and notice it is increasing in δ and
satisﬁes ϑ(0) = 0. We thus conclude that Θ0 (z) > 0 for all z ∈ [0,1].
Next, the fact that (1 − αx)xα/(1−α) is increasing in x for α ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1) implies that Θ(0) < 1
and Θ(1) > 1. Hence, there exists a unique ¯ zMS such that Θ(z) < 1 for 0 <z<¯ zMS, Θ(z) > 1 for
¯ zMS <z<1,a n dΘ(z)=1for z =¯ zMS. Notice that Assumption 2 is not necessary for this result. To
complete the proof, note that for z ∈ (0,1), AM(z) <A (z) if and only if Θ(z) < 1; AM(z) >A (z) if
and only if Θ(z) > 1;a n dAM(z)=A(z) if and only if Θ(z)=1 . Finally, for z =1 , straightforward
manipulation yields AM(1) >A(1).
C. Discussion of Assumption 2
As argued in the main text, the proof of Lemma 3 is straightforward when AM (z) is non-increasing in z for
all z ∈ [0,1].S i m p l ed i ﬀerentiation of equation (7) shows that this is the case whenever
r(z,δ,α)=l n
Ã
1 − 1
2α(1 + δ
α (1 − 2z))
1 − α
µ
1
2
(1 + δ
α)
¶α/(1−α)!
−
δ
ααz
1 − 1
2α(1 + δ
α (1 − 2z))
< 0.
It is easy to show that ∂r(·)/∂z ≥ 0 for all z ∈ [0,1] (with strict inequality for z>0), which implies that
AM (z) will be decreasing for all z if the slope at z =1is negative. Diﬀerentiating r(1,δ,α) with respect
to δ, one can show that the slope at 1 is increasing in δ and is negative when evaluated at δ =( 1 /2)
1/α.I t
follows that if δ
α < 1/2, AM (z) is non-increasing in z for all z ∈ [0,1].
When δ
α > 1/2,t h eAM (z) curve will still be decreasing in z for suﬃciently low z, but it may tilt up
when z is suﬃciently close to one. In those cases, ﬁrm behavior will still be exactly as described in Lemma
3 of section 4 provided that AM(z) equals ω for only one z ≤ z ≡ A−1 (ω). In other words, the AM (z)
curve may intersect ω for high values of z, but this is immaterial because arm’s length transacting dominates
insourcing at those values of z.
Conversely, when δ
α > 1/2 and AM (z) equals ω for two values of z less than z, ﬁrm behavior is a bit
more complex than as described in Lemma 3.35 Denote these two thresholds by zMN and z0
MN.A s i n
Lemma 3, ﬁrms will produce the low-tech input in the North for z<zMN, and they will contract with an
arm’s-length Southern producer when z>zMS. The only diﬀerence is that multinational ﬁrms will emerge
only in the interval (zMN,z0
MN) ⊂ (zMN,zMS), while Northern assembly will be the preferred option not
only for z<zMN but also for z ∈ (z0
MN,zMS). In the dynamic extension of the model, this implies that
the model may predict that assembly returns to the North for some intermediate levels of standardization.
The economics behind these results are as follows. Incomplete contracting has two eﬀects on proﬁts
35The convexity of AM (z) in [0,1] ensures that AM (z)=ω f o ra tm o s tt w ov a l u e so fz.
24— compare equation (3) with equations (4) or (6). On the one hand, contractual frictions lead to under-
production of both xh and xl, which translates into lower sale revenues and proﬁts. On the other hand,
these frictions create rents, thereby increasing the fraction of revenues that producers are able to capture
as operating proﬁts. This second eﬀect is second order in the sense that, holding relative wages constant,
operating proﬁts are always higher under complete contracts than under incomplete contracts. This is a
desirable property of the model, because the existence of the second eﬀect seems much less robust to alter-
native modelling strategies.36 What matters for Lemma 3, however, is how the overall distortions vary with
z. This derivative tends to be dominated by the underproduction eﬀect which dictates that AM(z) be a
non-increasing function of z for all z ∈ [0,1].F o rs u ﬃciently high δ, however, the second eﬀect may actually
dominate thus complicating the analysis.
D. A General Equilibrium Version of the Model
In this section, I brieﬂy outline how the partial-equilibrium model developed above can be embedded in a
general-equilibrium framework with varieties in diﬀerent sectors featuring diﬀerent standardization levels.
For simplicity, I will only describe the general equilibrium at a particular point in time and will focus on
showing that the equilibrium wage in the North is necessarily higher than that in the South. In Antràs
(2004), I show that the economy in fact converges to a steady state equilibrium so the analysis below can
be interpreted as describing this steady state. I will also restrict the analysis to the case in which intraﬁrm
production transfers are ruled out (as in section I in the main text). In Antràs (2004), I describe the general
equilibrium with multinational ﬁrms and I also discuss several macroeconomic and welfare implications of
the model.
Consider again a world with two countries, the North and the South. The North is endowed with LN
units of labor, while the Southern endowment is equal to LS. There is a measure N of industries indexed
by j, each producing an endogenously determined measure nj of diﬀerentiated goods. Preferences of the
representative consumer in each country are given by:
(A1) U =
Z N
0
log
µZ nj
0
yj (i)
α di
¶1/α
dj,
Notice that all industries are viewed as symmetric with a unitary elasticity of substitution between them.
The varieties of diﬀerentiated goods also enter symmetrically into (A1), but with an elasticity of substitution
equal to 1/(1−α) > 1. As is well known, these preferences gives rise to a constant price-elasticity of demand
for any variety i in any industry j, yj (i)=λjpj (i)
−1/(1−α),w h e r eλj is a function of total world spending
36In particular, by introducing a rent-absorbing ﬁxed factor in production, this eﬀect would disappear.
25E and an industry price index. Because ﬁrms take λj as given, each producer of a ﬁnal-good variety faces a
demand function analogous to that in equation (1) in the main text.
Production of each ﬁnal-good variety is also as described in section I, with the additional assumption
that production of each variety also requires a ﬁxed cost of f units of labor in the country where the hi-
tech input is produced (i.e., the North). It is assumed that all producers in a given industry share the
same technology as speciﬁed in (2), with a common elasticity z(j).T o i s o l a t e t h e e ﬀect of cross-industry
diﬀerences in standardization, I assume that the technology for producing intermediate inputs, as well as
ﬁxed costs, are identical across industries and varieties. Firm structure is as described above, with the
additional assumption that there is free entry, so that the measure nj of varieties in each industry always
adjusts so as to make all research centers break even. The contracting environment is also analogous to
that of the partial-equilibrium model and, in particular, the parameter δ is common for all varieties and
industries.
Consider then the equilibrium in any industry j.37 Facing the same technology and contracting environ-
ment, all producers in the same industry will necessarily set the same price and therefore will earn the same
proﬁts. It follows that letting again ¯ z ≡ A−1(ω), in industry j the low-tech input will be produced in the
North if z(j) < ¯ z,a n di nt h eS o u t hi fz(j) > ¯ z, with the choice remaining indeterminate for z(j)=¯ z.T h e
equilibrium number of varieties produced in industry j can be solved for by using prices to compute λj,a n d
then setting operating proﬁts in (3) and (4) equal to ﬁxed costs, as dictated by free entry.
Free entry ensures that proﬁts are zero and thus all income accrues to labor. In the general equilibrium,
world income equals world spending on all goods — wNLN + wSLS = E — and the labor market clears in
each country. Using these conditions and denoting by F(z) the fraction of industries with z(j) < ¯ z,o n ec a n
derive the following equation linking the threshold z and the relative wage ω (see Antràs, 2004, for details):
ω = B(¯ z) ≡
2 − α
R 1
¯ z zf(z)dz
α
R 1
¯ z zf(z)dz
LS
LN ,
where f(z) is the probability density function associated with F (z). B(¯ z) is an increasing function of ¯ z
satisfying B(0) > 0 and lim¯ z→1 B(¯ z)=+ ∞. Intuitively, the higher is ¯ z, the lower is labor demand in the
South for a given ω,s oa ni n c r e a s ei nω is necessary to bring the Southern labor market back to equilibrium.
When ¯ z goes to 1, labor demand in the South goes to 0, and the required relative wage goes to +∞.F i g u r e
5d e p i c t st h ec u r v eB(·) in the (z,ω) space.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
37The unit elasticity of substitution between varieties in diﬀerent industries implies that we can analyze ﬁrm
behavior in each industry independently. This assumption, which is made for tractability, comes at the cost of
obscuring potentially interesting cross-industry interactions in the production transfer decision.
26The other equilibrium condition that pins down ¯ z and ω comes from the partial equilibrium in section
I. In particular, since α is common across industries, ¯ z is also common across industries and is implicitly
deﬁned by the equal proﬁtability condition ω = A(¯ z),w h e r eA(·) is deﬁned in equation (5). The function
A(·) is depicted in Figure 5 together with the function B(·).I ti sa p p a r e n tf r o mF i g u r e5t h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa
unique equilibrium pair (¯ z,ω). Furthermore, the fact that A(1) is greater than 1 ensures that the equilibrium
wage in the North is higher than that in the South, i.e., ω>A(1) > 1. This implies that Assumption 1 in
section I necessarily holds in the general equilibrium, thus granting validity to the analysis in sections I and
II.38
It is interesting to notice that in spite of the heterogeneity in industry product-cycle dynamics, the cross-
sectional picture that emerges from the model is very similar to that in the classical Ricardian model with a
continuum of goods of Dornbusch et al. (1977). Notice, however, that comparative advantage as represented
by the curve A(·) is here endogenous and arises from a combination of the Northern productivity advantage
in product development, the continuous standardization of goods, and the fact that contracts are incomplete.
Several implications of this general equilibrium version of the model are studied in Antràs (2004).
38The general equilibrium corresponding to the partial equilibrium model in section II is discussed in Antràs (2004).
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33Figure 4: Firm Boundaries and the Product Cycle
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